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Abstract
Two approaches for combining humanitarian mine detection sensors are described in
parallel, one based on belief functions and the other one based on possibility theory. In a
first step, different measures are extracted from the sensor data. After that, based on
prior information, mass functions and possibility distributions are derived. The combi-
nation of possibility degrees, as well as of masses, is performed in two steps. The first
one applies to all measures derived from one sensor. The second one combines results
obtained in the first step for all sensors used. Combination operators are chosen to
account for different characteristics of the sensors. Comparison of the combination
equations of the two approaches is performed as well. Furthermore, selection of the
decision rules is discussed for both approaches. These approaches are illustrated on a
set of real mines and non-dangerous objects and using three sensors: an infrared camera,
an imaging metal detector and a ground-penetrating radar.
Keywords: close range antipersonnel mine detection, data fusion, belief functions, pos-
sibility theory
1. Introduction
Multi-sensor data fusion techniques prove to be useful for two main humanitarian mine action
types: mined area reduction and close-range antipersonnel (AP) mine detection. In this chapter,
data fusion for the latter mine action type is addressed. Close-range AP mine detection refers to
detection of (sub-)surface anomalies that may be associated with mine presence (for instance,
detection of differences in temperature thanks to an infrared camera (IR) or detection of metals
by a metal detector (MD)) and/or to detection of explosive materials.
Efficient modelling and fusion of extracted features can improve the reliability and quality of
single-sensor-based processing [1, 2]. Nevertheless, taking into account that there is a wide
range of conditions and scenarios between minefields (such as mine types, structure of mine-
field and soil types) as well as within one minefield (e.g. burial depths and angles, moisture),
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there is no unique single-sensor solution, meaning that a high-enough performance of human-
itarian mine action tools can be reached only using multi-sensor and sensor/data fusion
approaches [3]. In addition, since the sensors used are, as a matter of fact, detectors of various
anomalies, the classification and detection results can be improved by combining these com-
plementary pieces of information. Last but not least, in order to take into account partial
knowledge, intra- and inter-minefield variability, ambiguity and uncertainty, fuzzy set or
possibility theory [4] and belief functions [5] within the framework of the Dempster-Shafer
(DS) theory [6] prove to be beneficial.
The chapter is organized as follows. An analysis of modelling and of fusion of extracted features
is performed. After that, two fusion approaches are presented, one of them being based on the
belief function theory and the other one related to the possibility theory. These approaches are
then illustrated using real data gathered within the Dutch project HOM-2000 [7], which are
acquired using three intrinsically complementary sensors: infrared camera, metal detector and
ground-penetrating radar (GPR). These results are obtained within two Belgian humanitarian
demining projects: HUDEM and BEMAT. Importance of collateral information (knowledge
about types of mines, mine records, etc.) is demonstrated.
2. About close-range detection
Due to a large variety of mine types as well as of conditions in which they can be found, no
single sensor applied in close-range APmine detection can obtain the necessarily high-detection
rate in a wide range of possible situations/scenarios. Thus, a logical way towards deriving a
solution consists in using several sensors that are complementary and taking the best out of
their combination. To this end, an infrared camera (IR), a ground-penetrating radar (GPR) and
an imaging metal detector (MD) present a very promising combination. In this chapter, we
describe two approaches for combining these sensors, one based on the belief function theory
and the other one on the possibility theory. These approaches can easily be adapted to other
combinations of sensors.
An important part of the work performed in the field of fusion of dissimilar mine detection
sensors is based on statistics [8, 9]. Examples of rare alternative approaches are [10] (neural
networks) and [11] (fuzzy fusion of classifiers). The statistical approaches lead to good results
for a particular scenario, but they ignore or just briefly mention that, once we look for more
general solutions, several important problems have to be faced in this domain of applica-
tion [12]. For instance, the data are variable, highly dependent on the conditions and on the
context. Then, it is impossible to model every possible object (every mine or every other object
that might be confused with mines). In addition, the data do not allow for a reliable statistical
learning since they are not numerous enough. Finally, the data do not give precise information
regarding the mine type, resulting in an ambiguity, typically between several mine types. Note
that in the domain of humanitarian mine detection, a vast majority of the fusion attempts, for
example, [13, 14], treat every alarm as a mine, and not as an object that could be a mine, but a
false alarm as well.
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In a previous work [15], a method based on the belief functions [6, 16, 17] has been proposed.
In this chapter, we compare it with an alternative approach, based on the possibility theory, in
order to take advantage of the flexibility in the choice of combination operators [18]. As shown
in Ref. [2], this is exploited in order to account for the different characteristics of the sensors to
be combined.
In this domain of application, to our knowledge, there is no work that applies the two fusion
theories in parallel or that compares them. In other domains of application, some works on
comparing the two theories are published, for example [19], where the qualitative possibility
theory is opposed to the belief function theory and a fictitious example of assessing the value of
a candidate is used as an illustration. On the contrary to that article, we use the quantitative
possibility theory here.
3. Numerical information fusion using belief functions and
possibility theory
3.1. Belief function fusion: overview
In the belief function theory or Dempster-Shafer (DS) evidence theory formalism [5, 6], both
uncertainty and imprecision can be represented, using belief functions and plausibility
obtained from a mass function. The mass allocated to a proposition A corresponds to a part
of the initial unitary amount of belief, which supports that the solution is exactly in A. It is thus
defined as a function m from 2U into [0, 1], with U being the decision space, also called full set
or frame of discernment. Usually, the following constraints are imposed:
mðΘÞ ¼ 0, ð1Þ
X
A⊆Θ
mðAÞ ¼ 1: ð2Þ
Not only the singletons of U but also any combination of possible propositions/decisions from
the decision space can be quantified in this framework. This aspect represents one of the key
advantages of the DS theory. As a matter of fact, this possibility allows for a rich and flexible
modelling, which can fit to a wide range of situations, which are occurring typically in image
fusion in particular. For example, the belief function theory can be successfully applied to
situations that include partial or total ignorance, partial reliability, confusion between some
classes (in only one or in several information sources), etc. [3, 15, 20–22].
In the DS framework, masses assigned by different sources (e.g. classifiers) are combined by
the orthogonal rule of Dempster [6]:
mijðSÞ ¼
X
k, l
Ak∩Bl ¼ S
miðAkÞ mjðBlÞ ð3Þ
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where S is any subset of the full set, while mi and mj are masses assigned by measures i and j,
and their focal elements are A1, A2,…, Ap and B1, B2,…, Bq, respectively [2].
As discussed in Ref. [2], Dempster’s rule is commutative and associative, meaning that it can
be applied repeatedly, until all measures are combined, and that the result does not depend on
the order used in the combination. After the combination in this unnormalized form [23], the
mass that is assigned to the empty set:
mijð∅Þ ¼
X
k, l
Ak∩Bl ¼ ∅
miðAkÞ mjðBlÞ ð4Þ
can be interpreted as a measure of conflict between the sources. It can be directly taken into
account in the combination as a normalization factor. It is very important to consider this value
for evaluating the quality of the combination: when it is high (in the case of strong conflict), the
normalized combinationmay not make sense and can lead to questionable decisions [24]. Several
authors suggest not normalizing the combination result (e.g. [23]), which corresponds to Eq. (3).
This fusion operator has a conjunctive behaviour. This means that all imprecision on the data
has to be introduced explicitly at the modelling level, in particular in the choice of the focal
elements. For instance, ambiguity between two classes in one source of information has to be
modelled using a disjunction of hypotheses, so that conflict with other sources can be limited
and ambiguity can be possibly solved during the combination.
From a mass function, we can derive a belief function:
∀A∈ 2Θ, BelðAÞ ¼
X
B⊆A, B 6¼∅
mðBÞ ð5Þ
as well as a plausibility function:
∀A∈ 2Θ, PlsðAÞ ¼
X
B∩A 6¼∅
mðBÞ: ð6Þ
After the combination, the final decision is usually taken in favour of a simple hypothesis using
one of several rules [25]: for example, the maximum of plausibility (generally over simple
hypotheses), the maximum of belief, the pignistic decision rule [26], etc.
For some applications, such as humanitarian demining, it may be necessary to give more impor-
tance to some classes (e.g. mines, since they must not be missed) at the decision level. Then
maximum of plausibility can be used for the classes that should not be missed and maximum of
belief for the others [27].
3.2. Fuzzy and possibilistic fusion: overview
In the framework of fuzzy sets and possibility theory [4, 28], the modelling step consists in
defining a membership function to each class or hypothesis in each source, or a possibility
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distribution over the set of hypotheses in each source. Such models explicitly represent impre-
cision in the information, as well as possible ambiguity between classes or decisions.
For the combination step in the fusion process, the advantages of fuzzy sets and possibilities
rely on the variety of combination operators, which may deal with heterogeneous informa-
tion [18]. As stated in Ref. [2], among the main operators, we find t-norms, t-conorms, mean
operators, symmetrical sums and operators taking into account conflict between sources or
reliability of the sources. We do not detail all operators in this chapter, but they can be easily
found in the literature, with a synthesis in Ref. [29].
We classify these operators with respect to their behaviour (in terms of conjunctive, disjunctive
and compromise [18]), the possible control of this behaviour, their properties and their deci-
siveness, which proved to be useful for several applications [29]. It should be noted that, unlike
other data fusion theories (e.g. Bayesian or Dempster-Shafer combination), fuzzy sets provide
a great flexibility in the choice of the operator that can be adapted to any situation at hand. In
particular, nothing prevents using different operators for different hypotheses or different
sources of information.
An advantage of this approach is that it is able to combine heterogeneous information, which
is usually the case in multi-source fusion (as in both examples developed in the next sections),
and to avoid to define a more or less arbitrary and questionable metric between pieces of
information issued from these images, since each piece of information is converted in mem-
bership functions or possibility distributions over the same decision space.
Decision is usually taken from the maximum of membership or possibility values after the
combination step. Constraints can be added to this decision, typically for checking for the
reliability of the decision (Is the obtained value high enough?) or for the discrimination power
of the fusion (Is the difference between the two highest values high enough?). Local spatial
context can be used to reinforce or modify decisions [2].
4. Close-range mine detection
4.1. Measures
From the data gathered by the sensors, a number of measures are extracted [15] and modelled
using the two approaches [2]. These measures concern the following:
• the area and the shape (elongation and ellipse fitting) of the object observed using the IR
sensor,
• the size of the metallic area in MD data and
• the propagation velocity (thus the type of material), the burial depth of the object
observed using GPR and the ratio between object size and its scattering function.
Although the semantics are different, similar information can be modelled in both possibilistic
and belief function models. The idea here is to design the possibility and mass functions as
similar as possible and to concentrate on the comparison at the combination step.
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The main difference relies in the modelling of ambiguity. The semantics of possibility leads to
model ambiguity between two hypotheses with the same degrees of possibilities for these two
hypotheses (e.g. Eqs. (7) and (12)). On the contrary, the reasoning on the power set of hypoth-
eses in the belief function theory leads to assigning a mass to the union of these two hypoth-
eses (e.g. Eqs. (9) and (14)).
Another distinction concerns the ignorance. It is explicitly modelled in the belief function
theory, through a mass on the whole set (to guarantee the normalization of the mass function
over the power set), while it is only expressed implicitly in the possibilistic model, through the
absence of normalization constraint.
4.1.1. IR measures
The possibility degrees derived from elongation and ellipse-fitting measures are represented
by pi1I and pi2I, respectively [2]. Being related to shape regularity, they are defined for a regular-
shaped mine (MR), an irregular-shaped mine (MI), a regular-shaped non-dangerous (i.e.
friendly) object (FR) and an irregular-shaped friendly object (FI).
In the belief function framework, the full set is:Θ ¼ {MR,MI, FR, FI}. As elongation and ellipse
fitting aim at distinguishing regular and irregular shapes, masses assigned by these two
measures, m1I and m2I, are split between MR ∪ FR, MI ∪ FI and Θ.
Regarding elongation, we calculate r1 as the ratio between minimum and maximum distances
of bordering pixels from the centre of gravity (we work on threshold images) and r2 as the ratio
of minor and major axes obtained from second moment calculation. Using these two ratios, the
following possibility degrees are derived:
pi1IðMRÞ ¼ pi1IðFRÞ ¼ minðr1, r2Þ, ð7Þ
pi1IðMIÞ ¼ pi1IðFIÞ ¼ 1 pi1IðMRÞ: ð8Þ
In the framework of belief functions, for this measure, masses are defined as follows:
m1IðMR ∪ FRÞ ¼ minðr1, r2Þ, ð9Þ
m1IðMI ∪ FIÞ ¼ jr1  r2j, ð10Þ
and the full set takes the rest:
m1IðΘÞ ¼ 1maxðr1, r2Þ: ð11Þ
In the case of ellipse fitting, let Aoe is the part of object area that belongs to the fitted ellipse as
well, Ao is the object area and Ae is the ellipse area. Then we define:
pi2IðMRÞ ¼ pi2IðFRÞ ¼ max 0,min
Aoe  5
Ao
,
Aoe  5
Ae
  
, ð12Þ
pi2IðMIÞ ¼ pi2IðFIÞ ¼ 1 pi2IðMRÞ: ð13Þ
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Masses for this measure are the following ones:
m2IðMR ∪ FRÞ ¼ max 0,min
Aoe  5
Ao
,
Aoe  5
Ae
  
, ð14Þ
m2IðMI ∪ FIÞ ¼ max
Ae  Aoe
Ae
,
Ao  Aoe
Ao
 
, ð15Þ
m2IðΘÞ ¼ 1m2IðMR ∪ FRÞ m2IðMI ∪ FIÞ: ð16Þ
Note that in cases where it is sure that all mines have a regular shape, the possibility degrees of
MR can be reassigned to mines of any shape (M ¼MR∪MI) while the possibility degrees ofMI
can be reassigned to friendly objects of any shape (F ¼ FR∪FI). Similarly, masses given to
MR∪FR can be reassigned to M, while masses given to MI∪FI can be reassigned to F [2].
The area directly provides a degree pi3I (M) of being a mine. Namely, since the range of possible
AP mine sizes is approximately known, the degree of possibility of being a mine is derived as a
function of the measured size:
pi3IðMÞ ¼
aI
aI þ 0:1  aImin
 exp
 aI  0:5  aImin þ aImaxð Þ½ 
2
0:5  aImax  aIminð Þ
2
, ð17Þ
where aI is the actual object area on the IR image, while the approximate range of expectable
mine areas is between aImin and aImax (for AP mines, it is reasonable to set aImin ¼ 15 cm
2 and
aImax ¼ 225 cm
2). On the contrary, friendly objects can be of any size, so the possibility degree is
set to one whatever the value of the size:
pi3IðFÞ ¼ 1: ð18Þ
The area/size mass assignment based on the above reasoning is given by
m3IðΘÞ ¼
aI
aI þ 0:1  aImin
 exp
 aI  0:5  aImin þ aImaxð Þ½ 
2
0:5  aImax  aIminð Þ
2
, ð19Þ
m3IðFR ∪ FIÞ ¼ 1m3IðΘÞ: ð20Þ
4.1.2. MD measures
In reality, as explained in Ref. [2], MD data are usually saturated and data gathering resolution
in the cross-scanning direction is typically very poor, so the MD information used consists of
only one measure, which is the width of the region in the scanning direction, w [cm]. As
friendly objects can contain metal of any size, we define:
piMDðFÞ ¼ 1: ð21Þ
If there is some knowledge on the expected sizes of metal in mines (for AP mines, this range is
typically between 5 and 15 cm), we can assign possibilities to mines as, for example:
piMDðMÞ ¼
w
20
 1 expð0:2  wÞ
 
 exp 1
w
20
 	
: ð22Þ
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The corresponding mass functions are
mMDðΘÞ ¼
w
20
 1 expð0:2  wÞ
 
 exp 1
w
20
 	
, ð23Þ
mMDðFR ∪ FIÞ ¼ 1mMDðΘÞ: ð24Þ
4.1.3. GPR measures
All three GPR measures provide information about mines [2].
In the of burial depth information (D), friendly objects can be found at any depth, while it is
known that there is some maximum depth up to which AP mines can be expected, mainly due
to their activation principles. However, due to soil perturbations, erosions, etc., mines can, by
time, go deeper or shallower than the depth at which they were initially buried. In any case,
they can rarely be found buried below 25 cm (Dmax). Thus, for this GPR measure, possibility
distributions pi1G for mines and friendly object can be modelled as follows:
pi1GðMÞ ¼
1
coshðD=DmaxÞ
2
, ð25Þ
pi1GðFÞ ¼ 1: ð26Þ
In terms of belief functions, the masses for this measure are
m1GðΘÞ ¼
1
coshðD=DmaxÞ
2
, ð27Þ
m1GðFR ∪ FIÞ ¼ 1m1GðΘÞ: ð28Þ
Another GPR measure exploited here is the ratio between object size and its scattering func-
tion, d/k. Again, friendly objects can have any value of this measure, while for mines, there is a
range of values that mines can have, and outside that range, the object is quite certainly not a
mine:
pi2GðMÞ ¼ exp 
ðd=kÞ md½ 
2
2  p2
 !
, ð29Þ
pi2GðFÞ ¼ 1, ð30Þ
wheremd is the d/k value at which the possibility distribution reaches its maximum value (here,
md ¼ 700, chosen based on prior information), and p is the width of the exponential function
(here, p ¼ 400).
Similarly, the mass assignments for this measure are
m2GðΘÞ ¼ exp 
ðd=kÞ md½ 
2
2  p2
 !
, ð31Þ
m2GðFR ∪ FIÞ ¼ 1m2GðΘÞ: ð32Þ
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Finally, propagation velocity, v, can provide information about object identity. Here, we extract
depth information on a different way than in the case of the burial depth measure [30] and we
preserve the sign of the extracted depth. This information indicates whether a potential object
is above the surface. If that is the case, the extracted v should be close to c ¼ 3  108 m/s, the
propagation velocity in vacuum. Otherwise, if the sign indicates that the object is below the
soil surface, the value of v should be around the values for the corresponding medium, for
example, from 5.5  107 to 1.73  108 m/s in the case of sand:
pi3GðMÞ ¼ exp 
ðv vmaxÞ
2
2  h2
 !
, ð33Þ
where vmax is the value of velocity which is the most typical for the medium (here, for sand, it
is 0.5  (5.5  107 þ 1.73  108) ¼ 1.14  108 m/s, and for air, it is equal to c), and h is the width
of the exponential function (here, h ¼ 6  107 m/s). Once again, friendly objects can have any
value of the velocity:
pi3GðFÞ ¼ 1: ð34Þ
The corresponding mass functions are
m3GðΘÞ ¼ exp 
ðv vmaxÞ
2
2  h2
 !
, ð35Þ
m3GðFR ∪ FIÞ ¼ 1m3GðΘÞ: ð36Þ
4.2. Combination
The combination of possibility degrees, as well as of masses, is performed in two steps [2]. The
first one applies to all measures derived from one sensor. The second one combines results
obtained in the first step for all three sensors.
In the case of possibilities, only the combination rules related to mines are considered. The
issue of combination rules for friendly objects is discussed in Section 4.4.
Let us first detail the first step for each sensor. For IR, since mines can be regular or irregular,
the information about regularity on the level of each shape measure is combined using a
disjunctive operator (here the max):
pi1IM ¼ max pi1IðMRÞ,pi1IðMIÞð Þ, ð37Þ
pi2IM ¼ max pi2IðMRÞ,pi2IðMIÞð Þ: ð38Þ
The choice of the maximum (the smallest disjunction and idempotent operator) as a t-conorm
is related to the fact that the measures cannot be considered as completely independent from
each other. Thus, there is no reason to reinforce the measures by using a larger t-conorm, and
the idempotent one is preferable in such situations. These two shape constraints should be
both satisfied to have a high degree of possibility of being a mine, so they are combined in a
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conjunctive way (using a product). Finally, the object is possibly a mine if it has a size in the
expected range or if it satisfies the shape constraint, hence the final combination for IR is
piIðMÞ ¼ pi3IðMÞ þ 1 pi3IðMÞ½   pi1IM  pi2IM: ð39Þ
The conjunction in the second term guarantees that piI(M) is in [0,1].
In the case of GPR, it is possible to have a mine if the object is at shallow depths and its
dimensions resemble a mine and the extracted propagation velocity is appropriate for the
medium. Thus, the combination of the obtained possibilities for mines is performed using a t-
norm, expressing the conjunction of all criteria. Here the product t-norm is used:
piGðMÞ ¼ pi1GðMÞ  pi2GðMÞ  pi3GðMÞ: ð40Þ
For MD, as there is just one measure used, there is no first combination step and the possibility
degrees obtained using Eqs. (21) and (22) are directly used.
In the case of possibilities, the second combination step is performed using the algebraic sum:
piðMÞ ¼ piIðMÞ þ piMDðMÞ þ piGðMÞ  piIðMÞ  piMDðMÞ  piIðMÞ  piGðMÞ  piMDðMÞ  piGðMÞ
þ piIðMÞ  piMDðMÞ  piGðMÞ, ð41Þ
leading to a strong disjunction [18, 29], as the final possibility should be high if at least one
sensor provides a high possibility, reflecting the fact that it is better to assign a friendly object
to the mine class than to miss a mine [2].
In the belief function framework, for IR and GPR, masses assigned by the measures of each of
the two sensors are combined by Dempster’s rule in unnormalized form (Eq. (3)). A general
idea for using the unnormalized form of this rule instead of more usual, the normalized form is
to preserve conflict [27], i.e. mass assigned to the empty set, Eq. (4). Here, a high degree of
conflict would indicate that either there are several objects and the sensors, as detectors of
different physical phenomena, do not provide information on the same object, or some sources
of information are not completely reliable. Our main interest is in the possibility that sensors
do not refer to the same object, as the unreliability can be modelled and resolved through
discounting factors [3]. After combining masses per sensor, the fusion of sensors is performed,
using Eq. (3) again. If the mass of the empty set after combination of sensors is high, they
should be clustered as they do not sense the same object.
4.3. Comparison of the combination equations
For IR, based on Eqs. (6)–(20) and (39), it can be shown that
PlIðMÞ ≤piIðMÞ: ð42Þ
This is in accordance with the least commitment principle used in the possibilistic model [2],
as usually done in this framework.
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As far as MD is concerned, there is no difference since it provides only one measure.
In the case of GPR, based on the comparison of Eqs. (25) and (27), Eqs. (29) and (31), as well as
Eqs. (33) and (35), we can conclude that Eq. (40) can be rewritten as
piGðMÞ ¼ m1GðΘÞ m2GðΘÞ m3GðΘÞ: ð43Þ
Furthermore, the application of the Dempster’s rule (Eq. (3)) to the mass assignments of the
three GPR measures results in the fused mass of the full set for this sensor:
mGðΘÞ ¼ m1GðΘÞ m2GðΘÞ m3GðΘÞ ð44Þ
which leads to
piGðMÞ ¼ mGðΘÞ: ð45Þ
This means that the ignorance is modelled as a mass on Θ in the belief function framework,
while it privileges the class that should not be missed (M) in the possibilistic framework (i.e.
the ignorance will lead to safely decide in favour of mines).
4.4. Decision
As the final decision about the identity of the object should be left to the deminer not only
because his life is in danger but also because of his experience, the fusion output is a suggested
decision together with confidence degrees [2].
In the case of possibilities, the final decision is obtained by thresholding the fusion result forM
and providing the corresponding possibility degree as the confidence degree. As almost all
possibility degrees obtained at the fusion output are either very low or very high, the selected
regions having very low values of pi(M) (below 0.1) are classified as F, and the ones with very
high values (above 0.7) are classified as M. Only a few regions exist at which the resulting
possibility degree forM has an intermediary value and there, as mines must not be missed, the
decision is M. In the following, this decision approach is referred to as dec1.
An alternative (dec2) for the final decision-making is to derive the combination rule for F as
well, compare the final values for M and F and derive an adequate decision rule. Due to
operation principles of GPR and MD, the measures of these two sensors can only give infor-
mation where mines are possibly not. As they are non-informative with respect to friendly
objects, it is not useful to combine their possibility degrees for F. Thus, for deriving the final
combination rule for F, pi (F), we can rely only on IR, that is:
piðFÞ ¼ piIðFÞ: ð46Þ
In the case of IR, since friendly objects can be regular or irregular, we apply a disjunctive
operator (the max) for each of the shape constraints. In order to be cautious when deciding F,
we combine the two shape constraints and the area measure using a conjunctive operator.
Taking into account of Eq. (18), this reasoning results in
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piðFÞ ¼ maxðpi1IðFRÞ,pi1IðFIÞÞ maxðpi2IðFRÞ,pi2IðFIÞÞ: ð47Þ
Thus, in this alternative way to derive decisions, in regions where IR gives an alarm, the
decision rule choosesM or F depending on which one of the two has a higher possibility value,
given by Eqs. (41) and (58), respectively. In other regions, at which IR does not give an alarm
although at least one of the two other sensors gives an alarm, the decision is based on the
fusion result forM, as in dec1.
In the case of belief functions, as shown in Ref. [15], usual decision rules based on beliefs,
plausibilities [6] and pignistic probabilities [26] do not give useful results because there are no
focal elements containing mines alone [27]. As a consequence, these usual decision rules would
always favour friendly objects [2]. The underlying reason is that the humanitarian demining
sensors are anomaly detectors and not mine detectors. In such a sensitive application, no
mistakes are allowed so in the case of any ambiguity, much more importance should be given
to mines. Hence, in Ref. [15], guesses G(A) are defined, where A∈{M, F, Ø}:
GðMÞ ¼
X
M∩B 6¼∅
mðBÞ, ð48Þ
GðFÞ ¼
X
B⊆F,B 6¼∅
mðBÞ, ð49Þ
Gð∅Þ ¼ mð∅Þ: ð50Þ
In other words, the guess value of a mine is the sum of masses of all the focal elements
containing mines, regardless their shape, and the guess of a friendly object is the sum of
masses of all the focal elements containing nothing else but friendly objects of any shape,
meaning that the guesses are a cautious way to estimate confidence degrees.
As the output of the belief function fusion module, the three possible outputs (M, F, conflict)
are provided together with the guesses, for each of the sensors and for their combination.
For GPR, the focal elements are only F and Θ, so guesses for this sensor become simply:
GGðMÞ ¼ mGðΘÞ, ð51Þ
GGðFÞ ¼ mGðFÞ: ð52Þ
From Eqs. (45) and (51), we conclude that for GPR, the possibility degree of a mine is equal to
the guess of a mine:
piGðMÞ ¼ GGðMÞ: ð53Þ
Furthermore, Eqs. (6) and (48) show that the guess of a mine is equal to its plausibility, while
Eqs. (5) and (49) show that the guess of a friendly object is equal to its belief. This means that
the relation given by Eq. (42) shows, actually, that for IR:
GIðMÞ ≤piIðMÞ: ð54Þ
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4.5. Results
The proposed approach has been applied to a set of known objects, buried in sand, leading to
36 alarmed regions in total [2]: 21 mines (M), 7 placed false alarms (PF, friendly objects) and
8 false alarms caused by clutter (FN, with no object).
The results of the possibilistic fusion are very promising, since all mines are classified correctly
with the proposed approach, as can be seen in Table 1. The numbers given in the parenthesis
indicate the number of regions selected in the pre-processing step for further analysis, that is,
measure extraction and classification. Regarding the combination operators, the results given
in this table are based on the combination proposed in Section 4.2. (Eqs. (39)–(41)). The second
fusion step is important, since a decision taken after the first step provides only 18 mines for IR,
nine for MD and 13 for GPR. This illustrates the interest of combining heterogeneous sensors.
The two decision rules, dec1 and dec2, give the same results for mines and friendly objects
caused by clutter [2]. In the case of placed false alarms, two are correctly classified in the case
of dec2, which is a slight improvement with respect to dec1 and the same result as for the belief
function fusion, shown in Table 2. It is not surprising that the placed false alarms are not so
well detected by any of the methods, since our model is designed in order to favour the
detection of mines. This is also the type of results expected from deminers. Regarding correct
classification of mines, the results of the possibilistic fusion are slightly better than those
obtained using the belief function method (19 mines detected, Table 2). This is due to the
increased flexibility at the combination level. False alarms with no objects are correctly identi-
fied by the belief function method (six out of eight), and it is the same result as for the two
possibilistic decision rules. This result shows that a power of our methods is in decreasing the
number of clutter-caused false alarms without decreasing the result of mine detection, thanks
to knowledge inclusion.
All results have been obtained with the models proposed in Section 4.1., with the same param-
eters. Note that although the general shapes of the possibility distributions are important and
have been designed based on prior knowledge, they do not need to be estimated very precisely,
and the results are robust to small changes in these functions. What is important is that the
functions are not crisp (no thresholding approach is used) and that the rank is preserved (e.g. an
object with a measure value outside of the usual range should have a lower possibility degree
than an object with a typical measure value). Two main reasons explain the experienced robust-
ness: (i) these possibility distributions are used to model imprecise information, so they do not
have to be precise themselves and (ii) each of them is combined in the fusion process (Section
4.2.) with other pieces of information, which diminishes the importance and the influence of each
of them.
Analysis regarding the robustness of the choice of the operator is also performed (within a
class corresponding to the type of reasoning we want to achieve) [2]. Different operators
within the same family have been tested, leading to the maximization and minimization of
the possibility degrees of mines, thus being the safest and the least safe situations from the
point of view of mine detection. The results obtained show that the model is robust indeed: all
mines are detected in the second step, for all fusion schemes.
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Differences between the results of Tables 1 and 2 can be formally explained as discussed in
Section 4.3. For GPR, Eq. (53) explains why the results are the same for the two fusion
approaches. In the case of IR, Eq. (54) indicates that the possibilistic approach would favour
mines more than the belief function approach, which is indeed the case here.
5. Conclusion
Fusion approaches for close-range humanitarian mine detection are presented and compared.
These approaches are based on the belief functions as well as on the fuzzy/possibility theory.
The differences at the combination step are mainly highlighted in this comparison. The model-
ling step is performed according to the semantics of each framework, but the designed func-
tions are as similar as possible, so as to enhance the combination step. Different fusion
operators are tested, depending on the information and its characteristics. An appropriate
modelling of the data along with their combination in a possibilistic framework leads to a
better differentiation between mines and friendly objects. The decision rule is designed to
detect all mines, at the price of a few confusions with friendly objects. This is a requirement of
this sensitive application domain (mines must not be missed). Still the number of false alarms
remains limited in our results. The robustness of the choice of the operator is also tested, and
all mines are detected for all fusion schemes. The proposed modelling is flexible enough to be
easily adapted to the introduction of new pieces of information about the types of objects and
their characteristics, as well as of new sensors.
The work shown in this chapter is useful in many other applications, even in quite different
domains, and constitutes thus a large set of methods and tools for both research and
Classified correctly, possibility theory Sensors Fusion
IR MD GPR dec1 dec2
M (total: 21) 18 (18) 9 (9) 13 (13) 21 (21) 21 (21)
PF (total: 7) 0 (4) 0 (4) 2 (6) 1 (7) 2 (7)
FN (total: 8) 0 (1) 0 (0) 6 (7) 6 (8) 6 (8)
Table 1. Correct classification results, possibilistic fusion.
Classified correctly, belief functions Sensors Fusion
IR MD GPR
M (total: 21) 10 (18) 9 (9) 13 (13) 19 (21)
PF (total: 7) 3 (4) 0 (4) 1 (6) 2 (7)
FN (total: 8) 0 (1) 0 (0) 6 (7) 6 (8)
Table 2. Correct classification results, belief functions.
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applicative work. The developed schemes have a noticeable variety and richness and consti-
tute a real improvement over existing tools.
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